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2Hang-Sheng Cheng*
Aftertwodecades ofdiscussion, financial reform
is now finally sweeping through the United States.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of
1980 andthe DepositoryInstitutions Actof1982 are
the beginnings ofamovementthat will significantly
alter the competitive structure ofthe nation's finan-
cial system. Similar movements are occurring in
several nations on the other side of· the Pacific
Basin, notably Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Philippines. There are reports that other coun-
tries-Korea, Taiwan, and China-are also con-
sidering reforming their financial systems.
Over the last dozen years, rapid changes have
taken place in national financial markets as a result
ofworldwide inflation and recession, technological
advances in communications and information sys-
tems, as well as the need to float unprecedented
amounts ofgovernment securities in national capital
markets. In the face of these changes, many out-
moded concepts about conducting monetary and
regulatory policies have had to be abandoned. Be-
cause these changes necessarily take place in the
context of a nation's political and institutional
framework, only by examining the actual experi-
encesofvarious nations can we gain insight into the
dynamic, symbiotic changes in market conditions
and government economic policies.
Australia and New Zealand's experiences pro-
vide two interesting cases for study. Working with
essentially similar financial structures and regula-
tory frameworks, the authorities in the two nations
reacted in markedly different ways to the inflation-
ary pressures that strained both their financial
structures.
New Zealand, in 1972, broadened and tightened
regulatory controls over financial activities in the
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hope of containing inflation and ensuring an ade-
quate supply of credit to "priority" sectors. The
apparent failure of the policy to achieve its objec-
tives and the growing market distortions that re-
sulted altered the authorities' perception of the
market's mechanics. In 1976, the government of
New Zealand began a series offar-reaching finan-
cial reforms that, by 1980, led to the lifting ofmost
financial market controls. But in November 1981,
as inflation continued unabated, the authorities
reversed the course of financial reform and re-
imposed interest-rate controls.
In contrast, the Australian authorities reacted to
the rising inflation of the early 1970s by raising
interest-rate ceilings and permitting the regulated
trading banks to diversify their activities through
subsidiaries in the unregulated markets. This more
flexible approach mitigated the pressures in the
financial system and helped stave off the need for
reform. However, over time, market distortions
accumulated and the drawbacks of the regulatory
framework became evident. Deregulation started in
1980. Once begun, the movement gatheredmomen-
tum and now the authorities are considering a thor-
ough overhaul ofthe financial system.
Regulations asMonetary Policy
In reviewing Australia's and New Zealand's ex-
periences, one should bear in mind that during the
1970s the monetary authorities in both countries
used regulatory policies-such as interest-rate
controls, restrictions on assets and liabilities of fi-
nancial institutions, and direct credit controls-to
attain macroeconomic policyobjectives. These pol-
icy tools were considered by the authorities to be
essential, integral,instruments ofmonetary policy. I
In contrast, the prevailing economic thinking in the
United States regards the tool ofmonetary policy as
consisting primarily of the ability to influence the
aggregate supply ofmoney orcredit to the nationaleconomy; rulesofconductforfinancial institutions,
to promote (or limit) competition or to ensure the
soundness of the financial system, are considered
instruments ofregulatory policy.
This conceptual dichotomy, which did not exist
in AustraliaandNew Zealand in the 1970s, pointsto
an important institutional difference between the
United States on the one hand and Australia and
New Zealand on the other. In the United States,
monetary policy is conducted primarily through
open money markets that did not exist in Australia
and New Zealand. Unable to conduct open-market
operations, their monetary authorities relied to a
large extent on regulatory policies for adjusting the
aggregate money (or credit) supply to the needs of
the national economy, As inflationary pressures
rose in the 1970s, market forces managed to bypass
the regulatory controls. Not only did the authorities
fail to attain their macroeconomic policy objec-
tives, they also distorted the market. Moreover, as
the regulatory controls grew tighter, they reduced
the chance for an open money market to develop
and made the monetary authorities even more de-
pendent on regulatory control for attaining macro-
economic policy objectives. When the authorities
realized the futility ofthis policy approach in their
institutional environment, they instituted sweeping
financial reforms. In New Zealand, reform took
place between 1976 and 1980; in Australia, between
1979 and 1980. The reforms removed not merely
regulatory controls, but the ideaofusing regulatory
controlstoattain macroeconomic policyobjectives.
The rest ofthis paper is divided into six sections.
Section I includes a briefsketch ofthe two nations'
financial systems to familiarize the reader with their
financial structures. The next three sections contain
a study of the two countries' experiences with the
use ofregulatory controlsto pursue macroeconomic
policyobjectives. The study concentrates on the use
of interest-rate controls, asset and liability restric-
tions, and direct credit controls. These three sec-
tions precede a review of financial reforms in the
two countries and the recent retractions in New
Zealand. The conclusions are in the final section.
I. The Financial Systems
A simple comparison in terms of the number of
institutions in various categories serves well to
identify the key characteristics of the financial
structures of Australia and New Zealand. Table 1
sets out these characteristics.
First, the banking systems and savings institu-
tions in both Australia and New Zealand are highly
concentrated. In Australia, seven nationwide trad-
ing banks accountfor 87 percentofthe total banking
assets; in New Zealand, five account for all.
2 More-
over, the large trading banks also own the large
savings banks in each nation. Indeed, the two types
ofbusiness are oftenconductedonthe same premise
by the same teller serving the two legally separate
institutions. The high concentration in banking and
savings institutions facilitates the use ofregulatory
measures for the attainment ofmacroeconomic pol-
icy objectives.
Second, in both Australia and New Zealand the
government participates directly in the financing of
national economic activities in competition with
private institutions. This is a feature that Australia
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and New Zealand share with virtually all the devel-
oping nations in the Pacific Basin region.
Third, in addition to the commerical banks and
savings banks, Australia and New Zealand's finan-
cial systems also consist oflarge numbers ofcredit
cooperatives, finance companies (for lending to
households and small businesses), security dealers,
life insurance companies, general insurance com-
panies, and pension funds. With a population of 14
million in Australia and 3 million in New Zealand,
these two countries' financial systems appear to
possess as full a complement of financial institu-
tions as other developed countries. We may pre-
sume that market forces are as strong.
Fourth, there is almost no foreign participation in
Australia's and NewZealand's commercialbanking
sector.
3 The virtual exclusion ofbanks from outside
their borders reflects the two nations' tradition of
protectionism in banking. This insulation from for-
eign competition has accentuated the oligopolistic
condition of their banking markets and possibly
slowed market adjustments.Policy Objectivesand Regulatory Controls
The Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand are the central banks of the
respective nations. Their responsibilities can be
broadly classified into three areas: (a) macroeco-
nomic policy objectives, such as full employment,
price stability, economic growth, and international
payments equilibrium; (b) prudential regulation for
maintaining the stability and smooth functioning of
the financial system; and (c) sectoral credit policy
for ensuring the availibility of credit on "reason-
able" terms to priority sectors, such as the govern-
ment, housing, export, and farming.
During the 1970s, the monetary authorities
attempted to achieve these diverse policy objectives
by employing a variety of policy tools. Besides
traditional monetary policy instruments (such as
foreign-exchange management, bill discounting
and advances to banks), they relied to alarge extent
on regulatory control of financial institutions.
These controls consisted primarily of interest-rate
controls, restrictions on financial institutions'
assets and liabilities, and direct credit controls. In
the following, we shall examine theiruse and assess
theireffects on the financial markets and theireffec-
tiveness in achieving the policy objectives.
II. Interest Rate Controls
In the early 1970s, the authorities in Australia
and New Zealand believed it essential for them to
assure the availiability ofcredit to at least the''pri-
ority" borrowers at "reasonable" costs. This they
sought to achieve by regulating the volume and
direction ofcredit extension and by setting ceilings
on interest rates banks were allowed to charge.
Since setting maximum loan rates without control-
ling the cost ofbanking funds would not be a work-
able policy, it was deemed necessary to regulate
maximum deposit rates as well.
Interest Rate Ceilings
In the 1970s, Australian banks and savings insti-
tutions were subject to loan rate ceilings. Early in
that decade, the control presented no real restriction
as banks could charge more than the rate of con-
TABLE 1











7 nationwide (I government)
4 regional (3 government)
2 small foreign
7 nationwide (I government)
5 regional (3 government)
120 building societies
700 credit cooperatives





46 life insurance cos.
200 general insurance
pension funds (no data)
NewZealand
5 nationwide (1 government, 3 foreign)
5 nationwide (I government)
12 regional





merchant banks (no data)
436 finance companies
20 rural agencies
solicitor's nominee cos. (no data)
4 security dealers
31 life insurance
general insurance (no data)
213 pension funds
Sources:AustralianFinancial System: Interim Reportofthe CommitteeofInquiry (Canberra: AustralianGovernmentPublishing Service,
1980; hereafter, 'Interim Report'), pp. 110-178. R.S. Deane and P.W.E. Nicholl, editors, Monetary Policy and the New Zealand
FinancialSystem. (Wellington: Reserve BankofNew Zealand, 1979) pp. 29-116.
IIsumer-price inflation. In 1970, for example, the
maximum allowable loan rate was 814 percent, in-
flation ran at 3.2 percent, and banks charged a
weighted average loan rate of 7.60 percent.
4 The
Reserve Bankin concert with state regulatory agen-
cies ensured that the loan rates of the building
societies and the credit coopt;ratives under the state
agencies' jurisdiction conformed to those of the
trading banks.s Similarly, banks in New Zealand
were also subject to interest-rate ceilings, but the
limits there were apparently more restrictive. For
instance, in 1973, the maximum lending rate in
New Zealand was 5.84percentwhile the consumer-
price inflation rate was 8 percent.
6
On the deposit-rate side, banks in Australia and
New Zealand were constrainedto pay no intereston
demand deposits. On passbook savings deposits,
they could pay only 3.75 percent in Australia and 3
percentin New Zealand.7
On time deposits, bothcountries permitted banks
to pay higher interest rates to large deposits than to
small deposits. Since 1973, banks in Australia have
been free to set the rates they pay on large certifi-
cates of deposits,S but on other time deposits an
interest-rate ceiling of6.5 percent applied in 1973.
In New Zealand, both large and small time deposits
were subject to rate ceilings, although the rate was
higher (e.g. 7.25 percent in 1972) for deposits of
more than $25,000 than for smaller deposits (6
percent in 1972).9
The reason for allowing this discrepancy in inter-
est rates for deposits ofdifferent sizes was to enable
banks to compete for funds in the open market,
where the large investors were presumably more
sensitive to interest-rate differentials. The two-tier
interest-rate system appears to have been acompro-
mise measure to keep deposit-rate controls while
minimizing the risk ofdisintermediation. These ob-
jectives, however, were achieved at the expense of
small depositors.
Besides interest-rate ceilings on bank loans and
deposits, the monetary authorities in both countries
also set interest rates on government securities.
Typically, the rates were below competitive-market
rates. For instance, throughout the 1970s, the real
returns (i.e., afterdeducting the rate ofinflation) on
three-month Treasury bills were consistently nega-
tive in New Zealand and were positive in Australia
12
only in 1970 and 1971 (Table 2). The governments
were able to sell the securities only by requiring
financial institutions to hold the securities in their
portfolios in some proportion to their deposits or
assets.
DivergentPolicies
Although Australia and New Zealand started out
with similarinterest-rate policies in the early 1970s,
the way they implemented those policies diverged
significantly afterwards. Broadly speaking, the
Reserve Bank of Australia appears to have been
more sensitive to the limitations of interest rate
controls and consequently showed greater flexibil-
ity in raising the interest rate ceilings as the inflation
rate rose. For instance, as the inflation rate in-
creased from 3 percent in mid-I970 to nearly 17
percentin mid-1975, the maximum depositrate was
raised from 5.5 percent to 10 percent (Table 2).
Moreover, the Australian authorities confinedthe
interest rate controls to the banking sector and left
the nonbank financial institutions largely unregu-
lated. Major trading banks in Australia had exten-
sive equity interest in the unregulated nonbank fi-
nancial institutions. For instance, they accounted
for 50 percent of the total assets of the finance
companies in Australia. 10 Hence, competition from
the unregulated financial market presented less ofa
threat than it would have been were the trading
banks not heavily represented in the unregulated
market as well.
In contrast, the authorities in New Zealand were
much less flexible in administering their interest
rate policy. Inflation was already accelerating as the
decade opened, reaching a double-digit level in
1971 (Table 2). In 1972, the authorities responded
by promulgating comprehensive interest rate con-
trols overall financial institutions, including build-
ing societies, finance companies, merchant banks
and insurance companies. At the same time, they
reimposed a ceiling on banks' large-deposit rate.
Moreover, as inflation accelerated to 11 percent in
1974, the authorities lowered the small-deposit rate
from 6 percentto 4.25 percentand the large-deposit
rate from 7.25 percent to 6.75 percent instead of
raising the interest rate ceilings. Apparently the
action was an attempt to lower inflationary pres-
sures by reducing the cost ofcredit.
11As might beexpected, setting interestrates below
competitive-market rates, and even below inflation
rates, brought out strong incentives for the market
to find channels otherthan regulated financial insti-
tutions for placing funds. How investors bypassed
the regulated channels can be illustrated by the
following four cases: (I) the rise and fall of the
commercial-bill market in New Zealand, (2) the
boom in a "curbmarket" for mortgage financing in
New Zealand, (3) funds raised in the government
securities market in Australia and New Zealand,
and (4) relative growth ofthe regulated and unregu-
lated financial sectors in Australia.
CaseI: TheCommercial-BillMarket
From relative insignificance in the early 1970s,
the commercial-bill market in New Zealand grew
rapidly from 1972 on as all financial institutions
came under interest rate control. At the endof1973,
total commercial bills outstanding were $113 mil-
lion. Unregulated, the 90-day bills paid 10 percent
at mid-1974 and rose to 15 percent by October at a
time when the controlled Treasury bill rate was
paying only 2 percent and large time deposits only
6.75 percent (Table 2). In response to such strong
incentives, the commercial-bill market grew by 66










































































































1970 4.0 4.8 7.5 3.9 na 6.5
71 4.2 6.2 8.5 4.2 na 10.5
72 6.0 7.2 7.2 4.0 na 7.0
73 6.0 7.2 7.2 2.0 na 8.1
74 4.2 6.7 10.0 2.0 10.0 11.1
75 5.5 6.7 12.0 2.0 8.7 14.7
76 6.5 9.5 11.5 4.0 7.5 16.9
77 6.5 12.5 13.7 7.0 14.2 14.4
78 8.8 11.5 13.7 7.5 11.0 12.0
79 10.5 13.3 15.5 10.6 15.5 13.6
80 12.5 14.0 16.5 11.2 13.5 17.2
81 13.5 14.5 16.5 11.2 15.0 15.4
Sources: Australia. 'Interim Report,' pp. 219 and 221. Reserve Bank ofAustralia, Bulletin. September 1982, p. 196.
NewZealand. R.S. "Interestrate policy: aNew Zealandquandry," Reserve BankofNew Zealand, Research PaperNo. 17, March 1975,
pp. 20-21. R.S. Deane, "Lessons from the New Zealand financial system," Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand, Discussion Paper D79/5,
July 1979. p. 13.
NewZealandDepartmentofStatistics, Monthly AbstractofStatistics, August 1982, p. 77.
Reserve BankofNew Zealand, Bulletin, September 1982, p. 401.
13In November of 1974, the Reserve Bank insti-
tuted a series of regular meetings with the major
dealers in the market to request that (I) bills in
denominations smaller than $20,000 not be issued
to compete with the regulated institutions for small
deposits; and that (2) their activities not be ex-
panded beyond then-existing levels ofaccommoda-
tion. 13 The outcome was that the bill rate declined
after October 1974 to 8.7 percent in mid-1975 and
7.5 percent in mid-1976, in the face ofrising infla-
tion rates. The effect on the market was a predict-
able slowing ofgrowth. From the 66-percent rate in
1974, the amount of bills outstanding grew only 7
percent in each of 1975 and 1976. The nominal
slowdown actually meant shrinkage in real terms.
Thus, through official. intervention, the growth of
the commercial bills market in New Zealand was
nipped in the bud.
Case II: "CurbMarket" for Mortgage Financing
The saga of the so-called "solicitors' nominee
companies" in New Zealand had a different end-
ing, because the authorities were either unable or
unwilling to suppress their undertakings. 14 These
companies arose in 1969 as lawyers (solicitors)
handling real-estate transactions expanded their
normal escrow business by accepting funds from
clients, or "potential clients," nominally with a
view toward eventually purchasing houses. Such
funds were deposited in the''nomineecompanies,"
which were managed by the lawyers for a fee. The
funds were withdrawable on demand.
Information on deposit interest ratesis not avail-
able, but mortgage loan rates charged by these com-
panies in 1978 were between 12 and 15 percent.
After deducting the management fees and charges
forreserves, there should still be an attractive return
to the depositors at a time when the inflation rate
was about 12 percent and banks were paying 8.8
percentfor small deposits and I1.5 percent forlarge
deposits.
Typically, mortgages from these poolshada term
of only one to three years and did not exceed two-
thirds ofthe value ofthe property. Thus, borrowers
must provide a sizable equity and seekrollover of
theirmortgages, orrefinancing elsewhere, upon the
mortgages' expiration. Yet, even undersuch unfav-
orable terms, solicitors' nominee companies grew
rapidly. In 1977, these companies extended more
than $213 million in mortgage loans and accounted
for more than II percent oftotal mortgage finance
in New Zealand.ls
CaseIII: Government Securities Markets
As stated earlier, during the 1970s interest rates
ongovernmentsecurities in Australiaand New Zea-
land were set below competitive-marketrates by the
monetary authorities. Their sales were assisted pri-
marily by the requirement that regulated financial
institutions hold them in their portfolios in propor-
tion to their total deposits orassets. This "captive"
market consisted of trading banks, savings banks,
authorized money-market dealers, and life insur-
ance companies in Australia,16 and, since 1973, all
Table 3





























Sources: Reserve Bank ofAustralia,Bulletin, September 1982, p. 133; ReserveBankofNew Zealand, Bulletin, various issues;Boardof
Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System, AnnualStatistical Digest, 1970-79, p. 221.
14financial institutions in New Zealand.
How these regulations affected the government
securities markets in the two nations is evident in a
comparison of the net amounts of domestic funds
raised in the two markets with those raised in the
United States (Table 3). During the 1970s, New
Zealand relied on government agencies (other than
the central bank) and financial institutions to fi-
nance 90 percent of government debt, while the
corresponding ratios for Australia and the United
States were 52 percent and 13 percent respectively.
The "captive" market's share was 80 percent in
New Zealand, 35 percent in Australia, and zero in
the United States. Voluntary private financing of
government debt was only 3 percent in New Zea-
land and 28 percent in Australia, but it reached 64
percent in the United States. Apparently, the rela-
tive interest-rate flexibility in Australia and New
Zealand (Table 2) had much to do with the relative
size of the non-captive private market for govern-
ment securities in those two countries.
CaseIV: Regulated and Unregulated Markets
How interest-rate controls affected the relative
growth of the regulated and unregulated markets
can be seen in the data on their shares of the total
assets ofall financial institutions. The share of the
regulated trading banks and savings banks in Aus-
traliadeclined from 52 percent in 1953 to 39 percent
in 1978, while that of the largely unregulated fi-
nance companies rose from 2 percent to 14 percent
and that ofthe building societies from 1percent to 7
percent. 17
Comparable data are not available for New Zea-
land. However, for the mortgage finance market,
the share of the regulated financial institutions-
including trading banks, savings banks, building
societies, and insurance companies-declined
from 29 percentin 1970 to 19 percent in 1976, while
that ofthe unregulated financial sources rose from
16 percent to 19 percent. Direct financing by the
government and households accounted for the
balance. IS
Thus, it appears that interest-rate controls in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand resulted in the diversion of
flow of funds from the regulated financial institu-
tions to the unregulated. To the extent that both
investors and borrowers would have preferred ob-
taining financial services from banks and other
well-established financial institutions because of
their greater efficiency and expertise, the financial
disintermediation meant market distortion and a
loss ofeconomic welfare for the national economy
as a whole.
m. Asset and Liability Restrictions
Besides controls over interest rates, the authori-
ties in Australia and New Zealand also exercise
extensive controls over the assets and liabilities of
financial institutions. The most important of the
controls has been the use of" liquid-asset ratios" as
a policy instrument. These ratios require financial
institutions to hold a part oftheir assets in specified
liquid fonns in proportion to their total deposits,
borrowings or assets. In both countries, the re-
quirement for banks differs significantly from the
requirement for non-bank financial institutions.
Liquid Asset Ratios: Banks
The liquid-asset requirements fOf banks in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand are similar to the banking
reserve requirements in the United States in that the
15
requirements are also a principal instrument for the
conduct of monetary policy. However, the mode
of its use differs significantly among the three
countries.
Since 1973, banks in New Zealand have been
required to maintain on average over a calendar
month reserve assets not less than certain percent-
ages of their average demand and time deposits in
the preceding month. The eligible assets include
vault cash, deposits at the Reserve Bank, and hold-
ings ofTreasury bills and government bonds. 19 The
ratios varied frequently and widely. In 1977, for
instance, the reserve ratio for demand deposits var-
ied between 13 percent and 37 percent, while that
of time deposits was relatively stable, varying
between 10 and 15 percent.
20In contrast to New Zealand's separate reserve
requirements for demand and time deposits, trading
banks in Australia are subject to a two-tranche li-
qUid~asset requirement against total deposits: (1) a
primary reserve of minimum "statutory reserve
deposits" (SRD) at the Reserve Bank, and (2) a
secondaryreserve of minimum "liquid assets and
gov~rnmentsecurities" (LGS), consisting ofvault
cash, Treasury bills and notes, and otherCommon-
wealth Government securities. Presumably both re-
serve ratios canbe used as instruments ofmonetary
policy..In practice, only the SRD ratio has been
used as such. This is evidenced by the fact that the
SRD ratio has been adjusted frequently, varying
from 3 percent to 16.5 percent since 1960, whereas
the LDS has been held virtually unchanged at 18
percent through the years.2!
It is interesting to contrast the use of a reserve
requirement as a monetary-policy instrument in
Australia, New Zealand' and the United States.
First, the frequent adjustment of reserve require-
ments in Australia and New Zealand differs from
their virtual constancy over the years in the United
States. While reserve requirements in the United
States are used as a supplement to open-market
operations, they are used in Australia and New
Zealand as aprimary policy instrument for control-
ling monetary growth. The difference reflects the
lackofa well-developed money market in Australia
and New Zealand and the consequent inability of
their central banks to conduct open-market opera-
tions for adjusting the level ofbank reserves.
Second, the composition of eligible reserve as-
sets differs among the three countries. In Australia,
the SRD ratio includes only trading banks' deposits
at the Reserve Bank. The United States adds banks'
cash in hand and New Zealand also includes gov-
ernmentsecurities. Thedifferences among the three
help to bring out an important attribute of bank
reserve requirements, an attribute with significant
policy implications.
A reserve asset should yield significantly less
than any otherasset in the open marketorbanks will
not voluntarily minimize their reserve holdings.
And reserves in excess of banks' liquidity needs
would weaken the effectiveness of monetary con-
trol. Inthe United States, bothbanks' vaultcash and
16
deposits at Reserve Banks yield no return. In Aus-
tralia, bank deposits at the Reserve Bank have
yi~lded 2.5 percentperyearsince 1976,22 compared
to more than 8 percent on Treasury bills. In New
Zealand, the yields on government securities were
So far below the market yields (Table 2) that their
inclusion.in reserve assets presented no problem
prior to 1978. In 1978, however, the Treasury bill
rate was raised to more than 10 percent, making it
competitive with private market securities (Table
2). Bankscould then adjust theirreservesby buying
or selling securities·in the open market without
severe capital losses as the Reserve Bank raised or
lowered reserve requirements. Thus, adjusting
bankreserve requirements couldaffect interestrates
through the government-securities market, but it
could not affect the level oftotal reserves.2
3
Australia's payment ofinterest on bank reserves
and New Zealand's inclusion ofgovernment securi-
ties in reserve assets illustrate a basic dilemma
sharedby all monetary authorities. Monetarypolicy
must satisfy both the desire for money control and
the desire for competitiveequity andefficiency. for
effective monetary control, reserve assets must
yield below-market returns but for competitive
equity and efficiency, below-market returns penal-
ize banks and tend to lead to financial disinter-
mediation. Australia's payment ofinterest on bank
reserves comes close to offering a solution to this
dilemma, except that the rigidly-fixed, low interest




The Australian and New Zealand regulations for
nonebank financial institutions are similar in that
they both require these institutions to hold mini-
mum cash deposits at the Reserve Bank or trading
banks, and to holdgovernment securities in propor-
tion to total deposits (orborrowings orassets, as the
case may be). The two countries' regulations differ
to theextentthatthe Australian requirementextends
only to savings banks, while New Zealand's re-
quirementcoversallnonbankfinancial institutions.
Until recently, savings banks in Australia were
subject to the so-called "40/60rule," which should
be more accurately called the "7%/32%/60 rule."Underthis rule, savings banks mustholdthree cate-
gories ofassets in proportion to their total deposits:
(1)7.5 percent in deposits atthe Reserve Bank and
in Treasury bills; (2) 32.5 percent in cash, deposits
with other banks, other Commonwealth Govern-
mentsecurities and money-market placements; and
(3)60 percent in housing mortgages.25 The first
tranche mightbe interpretedas serving a mixture of
monetary-policy and prudential-regulatory pur-
poses; the second for prudential regulation and for
preserving a captive market for government securi-
ties; and the third for ensuring the availability of
credit for financing housing.
That the first tranche requirement can serve
monetary policy purposes is doubtful. As a rule,
savings banks in Australia do not offer checking
deposits that trading banks do.
26 In reality, the Aus-
tralian authorities have not used the tranche for this
purpose, as evidenced by the fact that the ratio
remained unchanged year after year. The case for
its use as protection for depositors is somewhat
stronger, especially since Australia does not pro-
vide deposit insurance. However, with ready access
to the majortrading banks, which, afterall, own the
major savings banks, it is not clear that the liquid-
asset requirement is essential for depositor protec-
tionYAs for assuring the availabilityofcreditto the
Government and the housing sector, little needs to
be said, except that it reflects social priorities but
distorts credit allocation.
New Zealand's liquid-asset requirements ofnon-
bank financial institutions are essentially similar to
thosein Australia, as are the reasons behindthem.28
New Zealand's savings banks are subject to a cash-
reserve requirement as well as agovernmentsecuri-
ties ratio requirement-Both requirements are stated
as ratios to total deposits.
New Zealand's government-securities require-
ment is notable for its application to all nonbank
financial institutions, although the ratios vary wide-
ly among them. For instance, in 1976 the require-
ment was 47 percent for all deposits at private
savings banks, 72 percent for time deposits at
private savings banks, 15 percent of total borrow-
ings for finance companies, 32 percent of"residual
assets" for private pension funds, and only 5 per-
cent ofassets or savings deposits for building soci-
eties.30 Given the wide disparities, it is hard to see
how competitive equity could be maintainedamong
the various types offinancial institutions.
Iv:. Direct Credit Controls
The authorities in Australia and New Zealand
have also relied heavily on direct credit controls.
Among these, one may distinguish between "gen-
eral credit control" and "selectivecredit control."
General Credit Control
General credit controls are often used to supple-
ment monetary policy when interest rates are set
below marketequilibrium rates. Since by definition
the condition implies excess demand for credit,
there exist strong incentives for the regulated insti-
tutions to raise the effective loan rates while keep-
ing the nominal rates underthe prescribed ceilings.
Theycan do so in a number of ways that include
charging loanfees and requiring compensatory bal-
ances or prepayment of interest. The favored bor-
rowers fortunate enough to be granted the much-
sought~after credits are only too glad to comply.
To preempt this kind of evasion, general credit
17
control is often used by the authorities as a supple-
mentary instrument prescribing either the level or
the growth rate of outstanding loans each lending
institution is allowed to maintain. It is a method
often used in countries where the monetary authori-
ties ..desire to target simultaneously both interest
rates and the monetary aggregates, orto have cheap
credits without inflationary pressures.
Afew instances illustrate how the policyhas been
applied in AustraliaandNewZealand. In Australia,
authorities asked major trading banks in September
of 1979, 1980 and 1981, to hold the growth of
advances outstanding to no more than a 10 or 12
percent annual rate. The 1979 directive was even
more specific: it required each bank not to exceed a
limit on net new lending commitments ofan aver-
age $30 million perweek?l
In New Zealand, for decades trading banks weregiven specific targets for total advances .32 In August
1978, the Minister ofFinance announced a private-
sector credit-growth guideline, whereby financial
institutions were advised that the overall level of
loans outstanding in the months ahead should not
exceed the previous year's level by more than 10 to
15 percent. In April 1979, the allowable growthrate
was reduced to 8-12 percent for the year ending
March 1980.33
General creditcontrol was abandoned by Austra-
liaand New Zealand after interest-rate control was
removed in both countries. The reasons for its
abandonment were clearly stated in Reserve Bank
ofAustralia's announcementofthedecision in June
1982:
"The move away from quantitative restraint
on bank lending is made against the background
of the rapid changes that have taken place in
recent years in the pattern offinancial intermedi-
ation....Much of the finance unavailable
through bank lending was being made available
otherwise, through channels and in forms which
were by definition not the first preference of
market participants."34
Moreover, it appears thateven before their aboli-
tion the guidelines were in fact more often breached
than honored. The 1979 and 1980 guidelines both
called for not more than 10 percent growth in bank
advances, but the actual advances during the years
ended in May grew by 17 percent in 1979/80and 13
percent in 1980/81.35 In New Zealand, the policy
was abandoned in March 1980 by simply letting the
April 1979 guideline expire without a replacement.36
Selective CreditControl
Selective credit control was used in Australia
until recently.37 It is still in use in New Zealand.
Periodically, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
conveys by. letter to trading banks guidelines for
lending priorities to ensure that the "priority" sec-
tors have accesstoan adequate supply offinance.
As explainedby the Reserve Bank:
"Agricultural and manufactured exports have
always hadtop priority because ofthe country's
tendency towards balance of payments deficits.
Finance for housing purposes, because ofits so-
cial importance, has also frequently been among
the top priority sectors. Lending to the private
sector for purposes other than housing, the so-
called service sector, financial institutions and
forthe imports has usually had low priority." 38
The Bank also reports that similarly specific di-
rectives have been issued to nonbankfinancial insti-
tutions such as finance companies, insurance com-
panies and private pension funds regarding the di-
rection oftheir investments.
The Reserve Bank itselfrecognizes the problems
created by direct credit controls.
"A wide range of direct controls would in-
crease the difficulties of administration, raise
problems ofequity, hamper the competitiveness
of the financial system and be inconsistent with
the recent trend in monetary policy towards more
generalized tools of control and a more flexible
and competitive financial system."39
Yet, the Bank has not found it possible to elimi-
nate the credit-control measures given the nation's
political environment.
v. Reform and Counter-Reform
In the preceding sections, we pointed out that
during mostofthe 1970s the monetary authorities in
Australia and New Zealand used various regulatory
controlmeasures for attaining policy objectives. On
the whole, Australia was more flexible in using the
controls, creating less strain in the financial system,
than New Zealand. In this section, we will review
the financial reform in both countries.
Reform inNewZealand, 1976-1980
In New Zealand, the various regulatory controls
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were used largely to combat inflation, but the re-
sults were disappointing. Inflation rose from 7 per-
cent in 1972 to 17 percent in 1976. The output
growth rate fell. The soundness of the financial
systemwasthreatened by increasingfinancial disin-
termediation. Controls to assure low-cost financing
to such priority sectors as the Government and
housing only resulted in retarding the growth of a
government-securities market and drove mortgage
financing into high-cost, high-risk, unregulated
channels. When, in March 1976, it became appar-ent that the policy appro~ch had not worked as
intended, the authorities instituted sweeping
changes.
First, interest-rate deregulation began. Ceilings
on trading banks' lending rates and deposit rates on
large (more than $12,000) long-tenn (longer than
three years) deposits were abolished. Smaller or
shorter-termdeposits rates and government-securi-
ties rates were adjusted upward. Most significantly,
all irtterest-ratecontrolsoverthe non-bank financial
institutions were lifted.
Astobe expected,thepartial deregulationleftthe
banks, especiallythe savings banks, unable to com-
pete for funds with all the other newly deregulated
financial institutions. In July 1977, all controlsover
both the tradingbanks' andthe savings banks' time-
deposit rates were removed. The only remaining
interest~rate restrictions were a prohibition of
interest payments on demand deposits and on de-
posits ofless than 30 days, and aceilingof3 percent
on passbook savings at savings banks (no such
deposits being pennittedat trading banks).
As the authorities freed interest rates in the pri-
vate sector, the Governmentfound itselfincreasing-
ly pressured bycompetition for funds in the market.
A deliberate two-part policy to develop a govern-
ment-security market began in August 1978. First,
the interest rates on government securities were
raised. This was supplemented by a new Govern-
ment savings bond, introduced in October 1978,
thathadafive-year maturityand yielded 11 percent.
Second, the Government sought to promote the
development ofa secondary market by designating
a number of "specialized dealers in government
securities" and giving them direct recourse to the
Reserve Bankfor conducting government securities
transactions.
The development of the government-securities
market in New Zealand meant that for the first time
the monetary authorities could control the money
supply by increasing or reducing bank reserves
through the open market. During the fiscal year
ended March 1978, for example, the Government
sold a net amount of $1,055 million securities, of
which the captive trading banks purchased $720
million, or 68 percent of the total. In contrast,
during fiscal year 1979, when government securi-
ties became market-competitive, the Government
sold $904 million securities, of which the trading
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banks took in only $101 million, or 11 percent ofthe
total. Thus, it appears that the market had been
opened to a wider public than before.40
In addition to interest-rate decontrol, consider-
ableprogress was made during 1976-80 in the
deregulationoffinancial institutions' portfolios.
For instance, in December 1976 the. restriction on
trading banks' lending to otherfinancial institutions
was removed. This action subsequently opened the
way to an inter-bankcall-moneymarket. InOctober
1977, trading banks were allowed to issue negoti-
able certificates of deposit and to invest in local-
authority securities. In April 1978, they were freed
to operate in the commercial-bills market. In Febru-
ary 1978, savings banks were pennitted to extend
consumer loans up to 2 percent oftheir total depos-
its; the limitwas completelyremoved in April 1980.
By mid-1980, New Zealand's financial system
was largely deregulated. Its savings banks in partic-
ular could make even more consumer and business
loans than theirU.S. counterparts, butsome restric-
tions remained. Savings banks were still subjected
to interest rate ceilings on passbook savings depos-
its. Building societies were still limited almost
entirely to housing mortgages. All the non-bank
financial institutions were still subject to the gov-
ernment-securityratio requirements.
41
Reform in Australia, 1979-82
Only for a few years did the breathtaking pace
with which New Zealand deregulated its financial
system leave Australia behind. As stated earlier,
Australia had avoided much ofthe stress sustained
by the financial system in New Zealand by being
more successful in bringing inflation under control
and more flexible in the use ofcontrols. Neverthe-
less, Australia also experienced disintennediation,
as well as stunted growth in the government-securi-
ties market.
In April 1979 the Australian authorities began to
relax interest-rate controls. The Australian Loan
Council announced that it would introduce a tender
system for issuing Treasury bills and a tap system
for selling Treasury bonds.
42 The fonner, byopen-
ing each issue to public bidding, let the bill rate be
detenninedby the market. Thelatter,bymaking the
governmentbonds in Reserve Bank's portfoliocon-
tinuously available to the public, accommodated
better the public's demand for government securi-ties. Both measures helped strengthen the function-
ingofthe market.
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Ofperhaps greater practical significance was the
steP.taken by the Australian authorities in Decem-
ber 1980when, in one sentence buried in a lengthy
statement, theReserveBankannounced: "Theceil-
ings.Wl. trading.and savings bank deposit interest
rates are being removed."44 Both the savings and
the trading banks were freed to compete fully in the
openmarketfor funds. The rates movedup quickly.
In mid-1981, according to one account:
,,...the rates offered by banks are now more
comparable with those ofother financial institu-
tions. In particular, savings banks are competing
directly with building societies, while trading
banks' fixed deposits on shorter maturities now
compare favorably with short-term money mar-
ket rates as well as rates on Treasury notes and
Commonwealthbondsofcomparable maturities.
As a result, there have recently been large in-
creases in the fixed deposits of both savings
banks and trading banks, while permanent build-
ing societies' deposits have fallen consistently
since January."45
Although ceilings on deposit rates were re-
moved, the authorities did not see fit to do the same
on lending rates. In the same action, in December
1980 the Reserve Bank merely raised the loan-rate
ceilings by2 percentagepoints from 10.5 percentto
12.5 percent. Nevertheless, this was a generous
move in view of the decline of the inflation rate
from an annual rate of 10 percent in 1980 to 9.4
percent in 1981 (Table 3). Still, the reluctance to lift
the ceilings on lending rates reflected the Reserve




The partial deregulation in 1979-80 in Australia
did notgo far enough in the eyesofcritics. In 1979,
even before the reform began, the Government ini-
tiated a comprehensive review ofAustralia's finan-
cial .system under the chairmanship of J. Keith
Campbell. The Campbell Committee heard testi-
monies from experts and commissioned studies on
various technical topics. In May 1980 it submitted
an Interim Report and in December 1981 a Final
Report.
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On conduct of monetary policy, the Committee
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reCOmmended targeting monetarypolicyintermsof
money-growth rates, specifically the M3 growth
rate. As instruments, the Committee favored open-
market operations and variable reserve require-
ments for banks only. Nonbank financial institu-
tions(NBFIs),the Committee believed, should be
exempt from reserve requirements because of
,'complex administrative problems" and doubtful
effectiveness. Competitive equity between banks
andNBFIscould subsequently be resolved by pay-
ing market interest on the reserves. TheCommittee
reCOmmended doing away with most ofthe policy
instruments discussed in this paper-interest rate
controls, general and selective credit controls, and
government-security ratios over and above reserve
requirements as a means ofcredit restraint.
On the government securities market, the Com-
mittee endorsed the tender system for marketing
government securities other than savings bonds. It
recommended that the terms and conditions ofgov-
ernment borrowings, including those of the local
government and semi-public agencies, be freed
from the Loan Council's control. Moreover, it
stated that all financial institutions should be freed
from requirements aimed at supporting the govern-
ment securities market.
The Committee also recommended that limita-
tions on bothdomestic and foreign entries into bank-
ing and other fields of financial activities be re-
movedto promotecompetitioninfinancialmarkets.
Inthe areaofprudentialregulations for" investor
protection," the Committee recommended aban-
doning theexisting legalistic approachofseparately
regulating the different types of financial institu-
tions. It endorsed a restructuring of the regulatory
framework by the primary functions financial insti-
tutions perform: for example, payments clearing,
nonbank deposit-taking from households, borrow-
ing from households through issuing debentures,
accepting large deposits primarily from business
firms and securities transactions. In each category,
the Committee advocated a national framework for
prudential regulation, the use of "liquidity ratios"
inadditionto thecapitalratios, andenhancedsuper-
vision bythe regulatory authorities.
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Ifhistoryis any guide, a comprehensive, rational
reform ofanation's financial system is likely to
encounter the combined resistance ofmany vested
interests at the same time. Over the past two dec-ades there have been several comprehensive re-
views ofthe financial system in the United States.
TheCommission on Money and Credit study (1961),
the HuntCommission Report(1971), andthe Finan-
cial Institutions and Nationlll Economy study (1975)
haveall recommendedcompleterestructuringofthe
fillancial ·system.•All significantly contributed to
greater understanding of the system's weaknesses
and the needfor reform. Yet it was not until market
forces·under the pressures ofinflation produced so
manychanges that were seriously damaging to the
regulated financial institutions that the demands for
reform became irresistible. Even then, a consensus
could not be reached. The Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act of 1980 settled for partial re-
forms.
49 And the Congress, two and a half years
later, had to pass the Depository Institutions Act of
1982 to improve banks' and savings institutions'
abilitytocompeteagainstthe money-marketfunds.
To what extent Australia will accept the Camp-
bell Committee's recommendations is hard to fore-
tell. The U.S. experience suggests thatderegulation
tends to pick up momentum once begun-unless
stopped by strong political opposition.
Counter-ReforminNewZealand, November 1981
As if to underscore the last point, in November
1981 New Zealand's government reversed the
course ofthe financial reform that had taken place
during the preceding five and a half years by reim-
posing interest rate controls. In the words ofPrime
Minister R. D. Muldoon, the action was made nec-
essary "bythe practice offinancial institutions dis-
regarding repeated warnings to hold interest rates
down.,,
50The next monththe Reserve Bank fixed
the lending-rateceilingatits levelon November25,
1981. Any increases above that levelmustthereafter
obtain the priorapproval ofthe Reserve Bank. This
regulation was interpreted to cover not only all
financial institutions but also any supplierofcredit
or purchaserofa financial assets, including trading
companies anddiscounters ofcommericalbills, that
employed more than $:2 million offunds.
The reimposition ofinterest-rate control was pre-
ceded by a yearofrising inflationcausedby a rapid
rise in the M2-growth rate. From an average annual
rate of 15 percent in 1975-77, the M2-growth rate
rose to 22 percent in 1978-79. With a lag the con-
sumer-price inflation rate also rose, from 12 percent
in 1978 to 17 percent in 1980 and 15 percent in
1981.
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The November 1981 measures had a familiar
ring. As described earlier, under the pressures of
rising inflation in 1972 the New Zealand Govern-
ment also imposed general interest-rate controls
with the express purpose of fighting inflation· by
reducing the cost of credit. How the policy had
failed to achieve its purpose, brought on increasing
distortions in the financial system, and then culmi-
nated in the financial reform of 1976, is now a
familiar story. Nearly ten years later, a full circle is
completed, except that this time, the public has
acquired the experiences and expertise in cir-
cumventing controls. The market shouldreact more
quickly to the controls this time, making them even
harder to manage than before.
VI. Conclusions
The conclusions of this paper may be summa-
rized as follows:
1. In many nations monetary policy and regula-
tory policy are closely interrelated. InAustralia and
New Zealand, prior to financial reform, anti-infla-
tion monetary policy was conducted to a large ex-
tent throughregulatory controls that had significant
impact on the competitive structure and efficiency
offinancial markets. Interest rate controls, for ex-
ample, resultedin disintermediation andretardation
of the growth offinancial markets, without attain-
ing their intended objectives. Disintermediation
meantincreasedmarketdistortions. Andthe stunted
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growth offinancial markets deprived the monetary
authorities ofthe use ofopen-marketoperationsas a
policy instrument for adjusting bank reserves, thus
further compelling the authorities to rely on admin-
istrative control measures.
2. Unable to conduct open-market operations,
the monetary authorities relied on frequent changes
of reserve requirements for adjusting the level of
bank reserves. Since for this policy to be effective
the reserve assets must yield below-market returns,
the policy imposed a burden on banks and other
regulated financial institutions and gave rise to fur-
ther financial disintermediation. In Australia, par-tial relief comes from interest payments on bank
reserves. In New Zealand, banks are allowed to
hold government securities as eligible reserve as-
sets. However, New Zealand may have lost some
monetary control when government securities be-
gantoyieldcompetitive market returns.
:3 ..I3Qth A.ustraliaandNewZealandrequirefinan-
cial .institutions to hold minimum liquid deposits.
The requirement has served little monetary policy
purpose. Itmightbejustifiedas a prudentialregula-
tion for depositor protection in the absence of
deposit insurance; however, given the lack of an
active government-securities market, its usefulness
for depositor protection is rather dubious. It is
primarily a device for ensuring a captive market for
government securities to help lower the cost of
government debt financing. As such, it is equiva-
lent to another hidden tax on financial institutions
and provides further impetus for financial disin-
termediation.
4. To supplement general monetary policy, the
authorities in the two countries also applied direct
credit controls as a means for restraining credit
growth and for ensuring credit availability for pri-
oritysectors. Theapproach againreflects thesubsti-
tution of administrative measures for the market
mechanism. It thwarts the proper functioning of
financial markets without accomplishing the in-
tendedpurposes.
5. Because all of these monetary control mea-
sureswere applied with greaterrigorand less flexi-
bility.inNewZealandthaninAustralia, problemsof
disintermediation and other distortions manifested
themselves sooner and to a greater extent in New
Zealand. Asaresult, more thorough financial re-
fOrm also began sooner in New Zealand than in
Australia.
By 1980 deregulation had made long strides in
both nations. Australia continues to explore further
avenues of financial reform, but New Zealand has
recently reversed its course. Ithas re-imposed inter-
est rate controls and brought its financial system
full-circle backto its state nearly a decade ago. The
action demonstrates that the course offinancial re-
forms is, in the short run, determined more by
political will than by market forces.
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